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Abstract The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United
Nations for the period 2016–2030 aim to achieve a substantial reduction of int-
erpersonal violence. An increasing body of evidence of what works, emerging from
randomized controlled trials, can inform public health policy decisions. However,
there is very limited evidence on the kinds of mechanisms that lead to sustained
declines in interpersonal violence at the population level. We discuss the implic-
ations of what is known about recent major declines in violence to guide violence-
reduction policies.
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Introduction
The 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have put violence
reduction at the heart of global efforts to create sustainable societies.
Goal 16 is entirely devoted to the promotion of peaceful societies and
the rule of law.1 Moreover, three of the 169 SDG targets focus on
interpersonal violence: Target 5.2 calls on governments to take
measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls;
Target 16.1 aims to substantially reduce all forms of violence and
related death rates everywhere; and target 16.2 sets the goal of ‘‘ending
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0197-5897 Journal of Public Health Policy Vol. 37, S1, S66–S80
www.palgrave.com/journals
abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and
torture of children’’.1
The SDG agenda is an extraordinary window of opportunity to make
substantial progress toward reducing all forms of interpersonal
violence, that is, behaviors that involve the use or threat of use of
physical force to hurt or damage other persons (such as child
maltreatment, intimate partner violence, robbery, assault, homicide).2
In the run-up to the adoption of the SDGs (2014–2015), several
documents have outlined recommendations about the global public
health strategies required to realize the relevant violence-reduction
goals.2–4 However, the SDG agenda also poses vast challenges.
Achieving significant population-level reductions across the world
within less than two decades presents a task for policy and research at a
scale for which no precedent exists in the field of violence prevention.
Evidence on the question ‘‘What mechanisms were involved in recent
major population-wide declines?’’ can inform answers to the question:
‘‘How can public policies accomplish a population-level drop in
interpersonal violence?’’5 This paper, therefore, examines the implica-
tions of the international crime drop in high-income countries since the
1990s for violence-reduction programming as part of the SDG agenda.
The Violence Decline in High-income Countries
Many high-income societies have experienced substantial declines in
interpersonal violence during the last three decades.6 The decline is best
documented for homicide, the most widely available indicator of
interpersonal violence: Across Eastern and Western Europe, North
America, Oceania, and affluent Asian countries, homicide rates have
fallen substantially since the early 1990s.7, 8 However, evidence for the
decline in interpersonal violence is not limited to homicide.
Table 1 shows comparative data for trends in two indicators that are
available for a large number of countries and that capture violence at
different levels of severity and in different social contexts, namely
overall homicide victimization and bullying victimization among
school-aged children aged 11–15. Homicide rates are based on the
global homicide dataset by Lappi-Seppa¨la¨ and Lehti.7 We extracted
frequent bullying victimization rates from the tables presented in
Molcho et al9 and Chester et al10 They are based on the five data-
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collection waves between 1993/4 and 2009/10 of the World Health
Organization (WHO) Health Behavior of School-Aged Children
(HBSC) survey.
The data show a decline of homicide rates in 25 out of 26 countries.
The relative change in homicide rates varies between -66 per cent
(Estonia) and 2 per cent (Greece). Frequent bullying victimization also
declined in the majority of countries. Twenty-three countries experi-
enced a decline, while three countries experienced some increase. The
relative change in rates varied between -71 per cent (Denmark) and 6
per cent (Canada). Relative change in homicide rates was significantly
correlated with relative change in frequent bullying victimization,
r = 0.48, p = 0.014.
The best-documented populationwide decline occurred in the United
States.11 Figure 1 shows standardized trends (1993 = 100) for five
types of interpersonal violence: homicide rates as recorded in the
Uniform Crime Record data12; overall violent victimization as mea-
sured in the National Crime Victimization Survey13; violence
Figure 1: The violence decline in the United States, 1990–2015.
Sources: Child physical and sexual abuse: National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System,
NCANDS, data reported in Finkelhor and Jones.19 Homicide: Uniform Crime Records.12 Violence
experienced in schools among 12–18-year olds: Kemp et al.14 Overall violent victimization:
National Crime Victimization Survey.13
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experienced in schools among 12–18-year olds14; and child physical
and sexual abuse according to the United States (US) National Child
Abuse and Neglect Data System, NCANDS.
The data show that in the United States, interpersonal violence fell by
between -53 per cent (homicide) and -77 per cent (violent victimiza-
tion) from 1993 to 2014. The trajectories were highly similar for
different types of violence. Furthermore, it was not limited to violence:
rates of property crime followed a similar declining trajectory, although
the drop since 1992 was an acceleration of a declining trend that had
already started in the late 1970s 13; teenage pregnancy rates dropped by
over 50 per cent since 199 2, 15 and among adolescents, alcohol use,
smoking, and the use of illicit drugs other than cannabis have similarly
declined over the last 20 years.16
Implications of the Violence Decline for SDG Programming
The decline of property and violent crime has attracted a substantial
body of scholarship. Much work focuses on the United States, but
researchers increasingly recognize that the similarity of trends cross-
nationally requires explanation.7, 17–20 Table 2 provides an overview of
the most common explanations, grouped along a dimension of
malleability through public policy intervention.
Table 2: Major explanations of the crime and violence drop
Non-malleable 
Processes
Dedicated Public Health 
Policies




Crime Control Policies Violence Prevention
• Demographic Change
• Economic Prosperity
• Dissipating Effects of 




• Declining Tolerance 
to Violence
• Legalization of 
Abortion
• Decline in 
Exposure to Lead






• More Effective 
Policing
• Improved Security, 
Situational 
Prevention
• Diffusion of EBP 
programming, e.g. 
parenting, anti-
bullying, social skills, 
offender treatment and 
rehabilitation
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Many findings about the causal mechanisms have remained contro-
versial, but several important issues emerge that can support the SDG
violence-reduction agenda.
Addressing broad risk factors and utilizing de-escalating dynamics
Policy makers are quick to claim credit when crime falls in their
constituency. The evidence suggests that policy makers sometimes
overstate such claims. Local or national policy decisions do matter.
However, work on the international crime declines shows that beyond
local, regional, and national influences, some broad underlying factor
has shaped the shared trend across high-income countries.21 Also,
neighboring wards, cities, and countries have had highly similar trends,
possibly meaning that de-escalating dynamics are contagious and self-
reinforcing, spreading across spatial units.22 Also, increasing evidence
suggests not only that different manifestations of violence tend to show
similar trends, but that at least in some countries, the decline in
violence is part of a bundle of related problem behaviors such as
property crime, substance use, or teenage pregnancy that have all
moved in the same direction.19
These observations suggest a common factor or some factors that
has/have affected the common underlying trend across space and
between behavior domains. This corresponds to findings at the
individual level where research indicates high comorbidity across
developmental psychopathologies, a lack of offender specialization,
and the subordinate role of domain-specific risk factors.23 Unfortu-
nately, researchers do not at present fully understand the nature of
these possible common causes. One hypothesis is a broad cultural shift
in much of the affluent Western world toward increasing emphasis on
self-control and a heightened moral proscription of behaviors that
harm others.24 Overall, these findings underline the significance of
prevention programming that broadly supports a healthy child and
youth development rather than focusing overly on specific subtypes of
violence.
Thinking beyond violence-prevention programming
Much of the decline in interpersonal violence in the US and interna-
tionally is likely unrelated to the specific programming of violence
prevention.19 Rather, much of the drop seems to be due to either
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unmalleable social forces (such as economic growth, drug epidemics) or
unintended side-effects of policies that targeted other goals.
One example is psycho-pharmacological medication, which has
recently found attention as a possible contributor to the crime
decline.25,26 Putative causal mechanisms include the comorbidity
between aggressive behavior and a range of psychiatric disorders
including depression, and negative effects of growing up in families
with multiple mental health issues on child development. In reviewing a
comparison across the US states, Marcotte and Markowitz26 suggested
that about 5 per cent of the decline in violence is due to the expansion
of psychotropic medication. Also, Finkelhor and Johnson25 showed a
fivefold increase in prescription of psychotropic drugs to adolescents
aged 12–17 between the mid 1990s and 2010, broadly in line with the
US drop in violence. Psychotropic drugs may explain international
patterns: Marcotte and Markowitz26 show that crime declined more in
countries with the fastest growth in psychiatric medication, especially
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). In the Netherlands,
Bouvy and Liem27 found a similar significant inverse relationship
between the decline in both homicide and the use of antidepressants
between 1994 and 2008.
It is unclear whether these findings withstand closer scrutiny.
However, they illustrate the importance of correctly anticipating the
potential for violence-prevention effects across different areas of public
policy. This includes education (e.g., teacher training), family planning
(e.g., family size), alcohol control (e.g., drunkenness), or urban
planning (e.g., access to employment opportunities).
Integrating crime control into a public health perspective
Researchers sometimes see public health approaches to violence
prevention as a superior alternative to costly and largely ineffective
crime control policies.28 However, the evidence on the international
crime drop suggests that crime control will likely play an important
part in the programming of violence-reduction goals: Two major
explanations for the US and the international crime drop with good
evidence both from randomized controlled trials and trend analyses
emphasize crime control, especially proliferation of security technolo-
gies and more effective policing.
Eisner et al
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Farrell et al29 argue that the international fall in crime is best seen as
a result of vast investments in security technologies that have affected
almost every aspect of daily life. This includes electronic immobilizers
to prevent car theft, wider installation of burglar alarms, CCTV
cameras in city centers and hotspots of disruptive behavior, a less cash-
based economy, more private security personnel, and mobile tele-
phones to call help and record crimes more easily. These findings
suggest that more coordinated efforts to build security and violence
prevention into daily technologies could be a critical strategy to support
population-level violence reduction.
Research has long assumed that evidence-based policing played a
significant part in the US crime decline.11 A recent aggregate-level
analysis (comparing trends in 50 states and the 50 largest US cities) of
the crime decline across US states concludes that change in policing
strategies, especially a data-driven police management approach that
emphasizes good management and accountability, was responsible for
5–15 per cent of the overall decline in crime.30 A growing number of
randomized controlled trials support these findings, suggesting that
innovative policing techniques such as problem-oriented policing, hot-
spots policing, and legitimacy policing have substantial violence-
reducing effects.31
Such findings bolster a core principle endorsed in goal 16 (‘‘Create
peaceful and inclusive societies’’) of the SDGs. We must integrate its
emphasis on the rule of law, access to justice, and effective institutions,
recognizing that public health approaches and crime control
approaches are interdependent components of a comprehensive
strategy.
Wider culture change
An elusive but potentially highly relevant mechanism for achieving
sustainable reductions in violence within the SDGs relates to wider
change in norms and attitudes. For example, some scholars have
hypothesized a link between the declining acceptability of spanking and
the drop in levels of violence in a society.32
Unfortunately, hardly any data exist to examine this or other
hypotheses about possible effects of ‘soft’ change in cultural standards
and aggressive behavior. For example, it would be useful to know
whether the drop in interpersonal violence across high-income
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countries can be linked to a population-level change in parental values
and practices. The evidence is not as clear as one would think. In the
United Kingdom (UK), Collishaw et al33 compared two major surveys
on parenting in 1986 and 2006. They found a significant increase in
parental monitoring and parental expectations, and the number of
youths disclosing their activities to the parents over the period. Yet
contrary to expectations, child conduct problems increased during the
same period. Similarly, Swiss data suggest a drop of youth violence by
40–60 per cent between 1999 and 2014.34 However, none of this
change can be attributed to adolescents’ experiences with parenting,
which remained unchanged during the period.
Societywide changes in beliefs related to violence potentially play an
important role for achieving the SDG violence-reduction goals.
However, there is very limited evidence to reliably assess the extent
to which beliefs and attitudes related to violence or parenting behaviors
and values have changed over the past 20 years, and whether they can
account for some part of the decline in violence.
How about Evidence-based Prevention?
The beginning of the violence decline in the mid-1990s coincides with
the initial move toward an evidence-based public health approach to
violence prevention.28 Since then evidence-based prevention (EBP) has
moved to the core of policy decisions in the field: In the United States,
clearinghouses provide policymakers with ever more detailed research
evidence about what works, and governments increasingly use the
evidence to inform their policy and budget decisions.35 In Europe, the
Scandinavian countries have probably taken the lead in introducing
EBP into their prevention strategies. Norway, for example, introduced
a nationwide system of evidence-based services to address child
conduct problems in 1998.36
But has the dissemination of EBP played a role in the decline of
violence across high-income countries? The answer is: We don’t know.
No study has yet examined empirically whether the natural diffusion of
EBP is associated with variation in the decline of violence at the
macrolevel.37 Why? There exist almost no detailed high-quality
comparative data on the penetration of evidence-based programs and
Eisner et al
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principles into local and national education, child services, health,
urban planning, and justice systems.35
We use the example of bullying prevention to illustrate the
challenges. Based on controlled outcome studies, Farrington and
Ttofi 38 estimate that on average, evidence-based bullying prevention
programs reduce bullying perpetration and victimization by about 20
per cent. Some countries have widely introduced such programs over
the past 15 years. For example, in the United States a survey in 2011
found that 75 per cent of youth aged 10–17 participated in at least one
school-based violence prevention program;39 in Norway, a government
initiative in 2000 led to national dissemination of the evidence-based
Olweus Bullying Prevention Programme;40 and in Finland, a national
trial evaluated the prevention program KiVa in 2007–2009, then
Finland rolled it out across all schools from 2009.
But was a wider introduction of EBP associated with a greater decline
in bullying victimization? No international indicators exist on the
extent to which education systems introduced EBP in schools. We
therefore tentatively used two variables on the strength of EBP research
to estimate a country’s endorsement of EBP principles: The first is the
number of evaluation studies per country included in the Farrington
and Ttofi38 meta-analysis. The second is the number of evaluation
studies per country included in the current WHO violence prevention
database.3 The indicators correlate with r = 0.80. We computed rank
scores for each indicator, and then computed the average. Twenty-six
countries had data on all four waves of the HBSC and these were
available for analysis. We coded thirteen countries with the highest
rank as ‘‘high EBP’’, and 13 countries with the lowest ranks as ‘‘low
EBP’’. Countries coded as ‘‘high EBP’’ were also much more likely to
report a large-scale implementation of anti-bullying programs in
WHO’s Global Status Report on Violence Prevention.41
Results appear in Figure 2. It suggests that countries with a stronger
EBP tradition had lower levels of bullying victimization in 1998.
However, there is no prima facie evidence that countries that promoted
evidence-based bullying prevention had a stronger decline over time as
compared to those who are lagging behind in the implementation of
EBPs in the area of bullying prevention.
Evidence-based prevention is based on the premise that if policy and
funding were based on what works, then a society would experience
better population-level outcomes in child maltreatment, bullying,
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sexual victimization, and street violence. The findings first suggest that
currently no simple link seems to exist at the level of countries or states.
However, the primary conclusion probably is that we need detailed
monitoring systems to observe the dissemination of EBP into all
relevant systems. This will be especially important in the new
‘pathfinder’ countries, countries that take part in the Global Partner-
ship to End Violence against Children, a major initiative by interna-
tional organizations including UNICEF and WHO to support countries
that commit themselves to a substantial reduction in violence against
children.42
Conclusions
The science of how to implement, monitor, and evaluate a package of
evidence-based strategies aimed at substantially reducing intimate
partner violence, violence against children, and violence in public space
at a global level over the coming 15 years is only just emerging. The
state of research, and its limitations, on the mechanisms responsible for
the decline in interpersonal violence in many high-income countries
Figure 2: Trend in ‘‘Being Bullied’’ frequently in high EBP and low EBP countries. Note: High EBP
countries: Austria, Belgium (French and Flemish-speaking parts), Canada, UK (England, Wales,
Scotland), Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, USA. Low EBP countries: Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Portugal, Russia.
Source: Multiple bullying victimization based on Molcho et al9 and Chester et al.10
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over the past 20 years can help to shape the global violence-reduction
agenda.
Second, research on the decline since the 1990s suggests that specific
violence prevention programming played a subordinate role in the
reduction of violence at the population level. A more comprehensive
approach should integrate emerging knowledge about the macrolevel
effects of broader public health policies, for example in the field of the
prevention and treatment of mental health more generally.
Third, improved policing strategies and the spread of security
technologies are among the few relatively uncontested contributors to
the decline both in the United States and internationally. This suggests
that integrating evidence-based crime control and public health
prevention strategies will be essential to achieve the violence-reduction
goals in the SDG agenda.
Fourth, the absence of reliable data makes it currently impossible to
determine with any degree of confidence, whether the dissemination of
evidence-based approaches across public health systems has positive
effects at the level of municipalities, states or whole nations. Detailed
high-quality data on the diffusion of evidence-based programs and
practices at local and national levels will be essential to assess whether
the planned strategies contributed to achieving the SDG goals.
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